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ABSTRACT: It is now commonly held that values play a role in scientific judgment, but 
many arguments for that conclusion are limited. First, many arguments do not show that 
values are, strictly speaking, indispensable. The role of values could in principle be filled 
by a random or arbitrary decision. Second, many arguments concern scientific theories 
and concepts which have obvious practical consequences, thus suggesting or at least 
leaving open the possibility that abstruse sciences without such a connection could be 
value-free. Third, many arguments concern the role values play in inferring from 
evidence, thus taking evidence as given. This paper argues that these limitations do not 
hold in general. There are values involved in every scientific judgment. They cannot even 
conceivably be replaced by a coin toss, they arise as much for exotic as for practical 
sciences, and they are at issue as much for observation as for explicit inference. 
KEYWORDS: values and science, inductive risk, ampliative risk, epistemic values, 
evidence, externality 
 
Introduction 
Recent philosophical literature on science and values has shown numerous ways in 
which science is not and could not be value-free.1 The point is not just that 
scientific judgment respects the value of evidence and theoretical virtues, but also 
that it reflects whether certain outcomes would be good or bad. Nevertheless, 
arguments for this often yield only a limited conclusion. 
First, some arguments appeal to values as a means of choosing theories in the 
face of empirical underdetermination. Yet, as critics note, it does not need to be 
values that fill the gap. In principle, a scientist faced with underdetermination 
between two options might instead just flip a coin. Call this the randomizer reply. 
Second, arguments for the value-laden nature of science often apply to some 
but not all science. For example, Anna Alexandrova argues that sciences of well-
                                                        
1 Elliott provides a systematic discussion of different ways that science and values may be 
connected; see Kevin C. Elliott, A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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being (ones which make claims about health, for example) necessarily and 
legitimately reflect normative judgments.2 Hilary Putnam similarly argues that 
sciences which employ thick concepts undercut the distinction between fact and 
value.3 These arguments do not apply, nor are they meant to apply, to abstruse 
sciences like astronomy or particle physics. The concept of the neutrino, for 
example, does not seem to have any intrinsically normative dimension. Call this 
the policy-relevance restriction. 
Third, many arguments show only that values enter into inferences from 
evidence to an underdetermined conclusion. The evidence itself is taken as given. 
The arguments, Kevin Elliott and Daniel McKaughn note, "incorporate 
nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic 
uncertainty."4 Matthew Brown decries these arguments for bringing in values too 
late. Adopting Brown's phrase, call this limitation the lexical priority of evidence 
over values.5 
In sections 2 and 3, I consider several arguments that values necessarily 
enter into scientific inference. These arguments, as they are usually posed, treat 
evidence and values as separate inputs to the process. In section 4, I consider the 
role of values in scientific observation itself. Heather Douglas provides a clear 
example in which scientists had to judge whether prepared slides showed tumors 
or not.6 The judgments were significant for environmental regulation, and so 
values were involved. Douglas argues that similar entanglement would not obtain 
in science without policy implications.  In sections 5-7, I argue that the connection 
between scientific judgment and values which is typified in ampliative inference 
and Douglas' example holds for all scientific observation. Scientists always have a 
choice about how to state an observation, between more significant but riskier 
formulations and less significant but safer ones. This choice always involves 
weighing values in the sense of the goodness or badness of various possible 
                                                        
2 Anna Alexandrova, "Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?" The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 69, 2 (2018): 421–445. 
3 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
4 Kevin C. Elliott and Daniel J. McKaughn, "Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of 
Science," Philosophy of Science 81, 1 (2014): 2. 
5 Matthew J. Brown, "Values in Science Beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk," 
Philosophy of Science 80, 5 (2013): 829-839. 
6 Heather E. Douglas, "Inductive Risk and Values in Science," Philosophy of Science 67, 4 (2000): 
559-579. 
Science, Values, and the Priority of Evidence 
415 
outcomes. This weighing could not be done without values (contra the 
randomizer-reply), it occurs in all science (contra the policy-relevance restriction), 
and it occurs in the very formulation of the evidence (contra the lexical priority of 
evidence). 
Underdetermination and Tie-Breaking 
Some arguments connect science and values in cases where the usual standards of 
evidence are insufficient to decide among competing hypotheses. The arguments 
hold that, in such cases, scientists may responsibly select the hypothesis which best 
accords with their value commitments. Call this the tie-breaker argument. It 
applies only to cases where hypotheses score equally well with respect to the 
evidence, and values enter only to break the tie.7 
A more subtle version of the tie-breaker argument is given by Helen 
Longino.8 She notes that connecting scientific theories to observable phenomena 
almost always requires auxiliary hypotheses, an aspect of underdetermination 
sometimes called the Duhem-Quine Problem. Values enter by way of value-laden 
auxiliary hypotheses, when matters cannot be settled by observation and value-
neutral auxiliary hypotheses. Like the less-subtle tie-breaker argument, values are 
in play only when evidence does not determine theory choice. 
Let's consider two standard replies to the tie-breaker argument. 
One response is to claim that scientists could break ties by using a 
randomizer instead of making value judgments. This response has a long history, 
although it seems to have been suggested independently by different thinkers. Otto 
                                                        
7 Magnus and Longino situate these arguments in a broader analysis of 'underdetermination;' see 
P.D. Magnus, "Underdetermination and the Claims of Science" (PhD diss., University of 
California, San Diego, Department of Philosophy, 2003) and Helen Longino, 
"Underdetermination: A Dirty Little Secret," STS Occasional Papers 4 (2016), Department of 
Science and Technology Studies, University College London. 
8 Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) 
and "Underdetermination." 
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Neurath suggests drawing lots.9 Gregor Betz suggests rolling a die.10 Inmaculada de 
Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann suggest flipping a coin.11 
The idea of this randomizer reply is that underdetermination only shows 
that something besides evidence alone must determine theory choice. Although we 
could follow our value commitments to select preferable theories or auxiliary 
hypotheses, we could instead use a procedure that is independent of our values. 
Randomly selecting one theory over its competitors (or one set of auxiliary 
hypotheses over alternate sets) makes the choice without regard to which would 
be better or which we would prefer. 
Nevertheless, adopting such a policy would be a practical decision. As an 
analogy, consider a mundane case in which I cannot decide which of two 
restaurants to visit for lunch and so flip a coin. My values and practical reasons 
have no influence over the outcome of the coin toss, of course, and so the selection 
is value-free to that extent. However, my values and preferences are involved in 
my decision to use coin-flipping as a way of resolving the choice. I want to go to 
lunch at one of two places, and I do not want to spend too much time or energy 
deciding. If someone asks why I went to one restaurant rather than the other, a 
complete answer would refer not just to the random process but also to the reasons 
I had for adopting that method. Similarly, deciding to flip a coin in the face of 
underdetermination would be practical and value-driven. Breaking ties by flipping 
coins would keep values from directly deciding specific winning hypotheses, but it 
would not ultimately escape the intrusion of values and practical decisions into 
theory choice.12 Just as values might lead us to prefer a specific outcome or some 
auxiliary hypotheses, values might lead us to choose a random method. Choosing 
to believe the outcome determined by the coin toss when evidence itself 
underdetermines theory choice is still a value-driven decision. So the randomizer 
reply fails. 
                                                        
9 Otto Neurath, "The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive: On the Psychology 
of Decision," in Philosophical Papers: 1913-1946, eds. Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983 [1913]), 1-12. 
10 Gregor Betz, "In Defence of the Value Free Ideal," European Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 3, 2 (2013): 210. 
11 Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann, "The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to 
Challenge the Value-Free Ideal," Philosophy of Science  83, 4 (2016): 505. 
12 This is one way to read Neurath's argument: Neurath thinks that we would prefer an epistemic 
culture that does not let our preferences directly decide theory choice. So, he argues, we should 
draw lots. Preferences are still at work, at the level of general policy. 
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A second response to the tie-breaker argument is to insist that scientists 
should never break ties with anything but further evidence. Rather, scientists 
should be agnostic when evidence is insufficient to decide between rival 
hypotheses. They should pursue each hypothesis until evidence is uncovered 
which breaks the tie without any appeal to values. Call this the wait-and-see reply. 
In answer to the wait-and-see reply, note that remaining agnostic and 
collecting further evidence is not always possible. As a practical matter, we cannot 
pursue every hypothesis. Pursuing hypotheses that figure in separate research 
programs may require different techniques, and so different investments in 
training and equipment. Although "thought experiments can be risked without 
hesitation," Neurath notes, it is not possible "in the same way, to train for more 
than one career."13 We could organize the scientific community so that different 
scientists were trained to pursue different research programs, but there is a limit to 
how many scientists can be trained and how many laboratories can be outfitted. 
Moreover, waiting for more evidence takes time. Brown argues that there are cases 
in which "we cannot wait for the end of inquiry for scientists to accept or reject a 
hypothesis, we cannot depend on anyone else to do it, and we must contend with 
uncertainty and underdetermination [... S]cientists find themselves in the business 
of accepting and rejecting hypotheses in such conditions."14 Even if we have the 
option to wait for compelling evidence, the cost of waiting might be higher than 
the probable cost of using quicker but less-reliable methods.15 
One may still insist that it is appropriate (insofar as possible) to respond to 
underdetermination by remaining agnostic and collecting more evidence. This 
would limit the scope of the tie-breaker argument to cases where agnosticism is 
impractical. It would still be a regulative ideal to abide with unbroken ties until 
further evidence could be uncovered to change the score. 
Retreating to agnosticism in this way would avoid using values to break ties 
between rival theories, but it would require that the evidence itself be value-free. 
Brown observes that the tie-breaker argument "begin[s] from a situation where the 
evidence is fixed and take[s] values to play a role in the space that is left over."16 
The underdetermination of theory by data, in its very formulation, concerns the 
inference to theory once data are given. It presumes that evidence comes first, 
                                                        
13 Neurath, "The Lost Wanderers of Descartes," 3. 
14 Brown, "Values in Science," 831-2. 
15 Elliott and McKaughn, "Nonepistemic Values." 
16 Brown, "Values in Science," 834. 
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before the question arises of whether values should be involved. Brown calls this 
presumption the lexical priority of evidence over values. He explains, "lexical 
priority means that evidence will always trump values."17 The picture is one on 
which evidence and values might independently underwrite our preferring one 
theory over another, and the lexical priority of evidence means that considerations 
of evidence always override considerations of values. The preferences 
underwritten by values only hold sway when evidence is silent and we are forced 
to make a choice. 
The wait-and-see reply works to limit the conclusion of the tie-breaker 
argument in two respects: First, values are allowed to play a role only for questions 
of practical importance but not for abstruse matters (the policy-relevance 
restriction). Second, values play a role only after the evidence itself is given (the 
lexical priority of evidence). 
Ampliative Risk and Our Duties as Knowers 
In drawing an inference from evidence, there is inevitably a tension between 
striving to believe the truth and striving to avoid error. Scientists might be quick to 
judge or more cautious. If they are too quick to judge, they risk believing in error; 
such a result is a false positive or type I error. If they remain agnostic, they risk the 
opportunity cost of not having an accurate belief that they could have had; such a 
result is a false negative or type II error. This tension is resolved only by assessing 
what the cost would be of each possible error—that is, by reckoning with values. 
Therefore, values enter into scientific inference. Call this the ampliative risk 
argument.18 
The impetus to believe truth drives us to adopt the claim best supported by 
evidence, but the impetus to avoid error drives us to wait and demand more 
evidence. William James puts it in histrionic terms: "Believe truth! Shun error!—
these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we 
                                                        
17 Brown, "Values in science," 836. 
18 It is standard, following Hempel, to call this the argument from inductive risk. I've opted for 
the label 'ampliative risk' because 'induction' is ambiguous between a narrow use (enumerative 
induction) and a broad use (ampliative inference) (Carl G. Hempel, "Science and Human Values," 
in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: 
The Free Press, 1965), 92). See also Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards, Exploring Inductive Risk 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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may end up coloring differently our whole intellectual life."19 A similar point is 
made by Richard Rudner, who writes that "our decision regarding the evidence... is 
going to be a function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a 
mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis."20 Heather Douglas puts the point 
in less grandiose terms: "Within the parameters of available resources and methods, 
some choices must be made, and that choice should weigh the costs of false 
positives versus false negatives. Weighing these costs legitimately involves social, 
ethical, and cognitive values."21 
The tie-breaker argument was (at least partially) defused because not all ties 
need to be broken. We could wait and see. The argument here turns on the fact 
that waiting and seeing would itself be a choice, with benefits but also costs for our 
overall system of belief. As a result, values are always involved in assessing "the 
sufficiency of evidence, the weighing of uncertainty, and the consequences of 
error."22 Douglas calls this an indirect role for values.  
Elsewhere, I have called this the James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis: 
"Anytime a scientist announces a judgment of fact, they are making a tradeoff 
between the risk of different kinds of error. This balancing act depends on the 
costs of each kind of error, so scientific judgment involves assessments of the value 
of different outcomes."23 The JRD thesis underwrites the ampliative risk argument 
but, as I will argue below, it is broader and more fundamental. 
Note that one could not get around the JRD thesis by flipping a coin in cases 
where the evidence is equivocal. Every ampliative inference involves reckoning 
with the risks of different kinds of error. Errors are always logically possible, 
precisely because the inference is ampliative. It is possible for all of the premises to 
be true, but for the conclusion still to be false. So one would be flipping coins 
always and for everything. 
                                                        
19 William James, "The Will to Believe," in Essays in Pragmatism, ed. Alburey Castell (New York: 
Hafner Publishing Co., 1948), 100. 
20 Richard Rudner, "The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments," Philosophy of Science 
20, 1 (1953): 2. 
21 Heather E. Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-free Ideal (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 104. 
22 Douglas, Science, Policy, 103. 
23 P.D. Magnus, "What Scientists Know Is Not a Function of What Scientists Know," Philosophy 
of Science 80, 5 (2013): 845. See also P.D. Magnus, "Science and Rationality for One and All," 
Ergo 1, 5 (2014): 129-138. 
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The ampliative risk argument as it is typically posed presumes that scientific 
inference leads to accepting or rejecting hypotheses.24 The costs and benefits which 
scientists are supposed to reckon with are conditional on making the right or 
wrong choice. So a standard rebuttal is to deny that scientists should ever be flatly 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses. 
Gregor Betz argues that scientists should report hedged hypotheses.25 The 
idea is that, instead of reporting a categorical result 'H,' scientists should instead 
report something like 'Evidence strongly suggests but does not decisively confirm 
H.' Notice, however, that hedged claims still express a degree of confidence. 
Scientists must decide how much to hedge. Less hedging is riskier, but more 
hedging courts triviality. In order to escape all danger of being wrong, scientists 
might refuse to make any claims at all. As Stephen John observes, the price of that 
epistemic security would be "policy-impotence," having nothing to say that could 
be of any use to policy-makers or anyone else.26 Scientists should, to use Betz's 
phrase, "simply admit their complete ignorance" in cases where they have no 
evidence whatsoever—but it would be pathological for them to plead complete 
ignorance just so as to avoid any chance of being wrong.27 
Responding to Rudner, Richard Jeffrey argues that scientists should only 
report probabilities.28 Even though this allows scientists to avoid deciding for or 
against H, they must still decide for or against the claim that the probability of H is 
p. A scientist might hedge this report by returning an interval p±e rather than a 
precise probability p. As the size of the interval is larger, the claim is safer but less 
useful in guiding action. The limit case, reporting that the probability of H is 
between 0 and 1, is a useless tautology. It does not even help to assume, as 
Bayesians sometimes do, that a scientist always has some degree of belief p in every 
hypothesis H. Since this could reflect their prior credence more than the weight of 
evidence, a scientist must still judge that it reflects enough evidence to merit 
reporting. 
                                                        
24 For the argument formulated in terms of acceptance and rejection, see (e.g.) Rudner, "The 
Scientist qua Scientist;" Hempel, "Science and Human Values," 92-3; Brown, "Values in Science." 
25 Betz, "In Defence." 
26 Stephen John, "The Example of the IPCC Does Not Vindicate the Value Free Ideal: A Reply to 
Gregor Betz," European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 5, 1 (2015): 9. 
27 Betz, "In Defence," 9. 
28 Richard Jeffrey, "Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses," Philosophy of Science 
23, 3 (1956): 237-246. 
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This reply is given already by Rudner, who argues that a hedged report is 
itself "nothing more than the acceptance by the scientist of the hypothesis that the 
degree of confidence is p or that the strength of evidence is such and such."29 The 
question is precisely what the benefit would be of making a less-hedged, more-
confident report (if it were true) and what the cost would be (if it were false). 
Settling on any particular conclusion, even if it is a conclusion about probabilities 
or the weight of evidence, is subject to ampliative risk. The JRD thesis applies, and 
so values play a role. 
Brown objects that the ampliative risk argument (like the tie-breaker 
argument) presumes the lexical priority of evidence over values.30 Note, however, 
that there can be no question here of evidence trumping values. The JRD thesis 
means that there can be no scientific conclusion without (at least implicitly) 
weighing the costs of various possible errors. There is no choice favored by the 
evidence alone, so a fortiori it makes no sense for that choice to presumptively win 
out.31 
The argument from ampliative risk does not yield the blanket conclusion 
that, as Stijn Conix puts it, "it does not make sense to think of values and epistemic 
standards as taking priority over each other."32 It makes sense to think of some 
values that way. If we rank theories according to how well they promote a 
conception of human autonomy and according to how simple they are, for 
example, then these separate rankings might pick out different theories as best. 
The values could give separate preference orderings. The point of the JRD thesis is 
that there are some values which cannot be separated in this way. The enthusiasm 
to reach for a possibly true belief or the risk-aversion which makes one remain 
agnostic even as evidence accumulates—these values do not rank the possible 
                                                        
29 Rudner, "The Scientist qua Scientist," 4, emphasis in original. 
30 Matthew J. Brown, "Values in Science." Brown calls the tie-breaker argument "the gap 
argument," and the ampliative risk argument is his "error argument." 
31 ChoGlueck argues that the error argument (the argument from ampliative risk) is just a special 
case of the gap argument (the tie-breaker argument). This is directly rebutted by the fact that the 
tie-breaker argument is vulnerable to Brown's worry about the lexical priority of evidence in a 
way that the argument from ampliative risk is not. Christopher ChoGlueck, "The Error Is in the 
Gap: Synthesizing Accounts for Societal Values in Science," Philosophy of Science 85, 3 (2018): 
704-725. 
32 Stijn Conix, "Radical Pluralism, Ontological Underdetermination, and the Role of Values in 
Species Classification" (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, Queen's College, Department of 
History and Philosophy of Science, 2017), 102. 
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choices apart from epistemic standards. Enthusiasm may make a scientist respond 
to preliminary evidence with belief when their colleagues demand more evidence, 
but it is precisely a disagreement about how much evidence is enough. Risk-
aversion will delay accepting a belief as evidence accumulates, but only an utter 
sceptic would refuse to believe regardless of how much evidence there might be. 
These values are entangled with the application of epistemic standards, so it makes 
no sense to think of one as taking priority over the other. 
A different way to construe the complaint about lexical priority is that the 
evidence has been presumed to be value-free. Although evidence and the costs of 
possible errors both enter into the epistemic calculation, they do so as independent 
variables. One may complain, as Elliott and McKaughn do, that the JRD thesis adds 
"nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration."33 
This objection is especially apt when the ampliative risk argument is posed 
in terms of type I and type II errors. These terms come from statistical hypothesis 
testing, where the problem is to specify a rule for accepting or rejecting hypotheses 
given a data set. The data set itself is not at issue.  This construal of the argument is 
encouraged by Rudner's insistence that "every scientific inference is properly 
construable as a statistical inference."34 It is also encouraged just by posing the 
argument in terms of inductive risk. 'Induction' and 'inductive inference' are often 
used narrowly to pick out inference from a sample to a population or from a finite 
track-record to a generalization. From given observations, the inductive problem is 
how to generalize or draw conclusions. Evidence is lexically and literally prior. 
Of course, James and Douglas do not pose the argument in terms of 
statistical inference. Their arguments apply to ampliative inference generally, 
rather than just to inductive inference narrowly-construed. Nevertheless, posing 
the argument in terms of inferential risk makes it turn on the move from evidence 
to hypothesis. Douglas specifies that values, in an indirect role, "determine the 
importance of the inductive gaps left by the evidence."35 Even though evidence 
does not recommend a conclusion without some values, the evidence is in a sense 
primary. 
 
                                                        
33 Elliott and McKaughn, "Nonepistemic Values," 2. 
34 Rudner, "The Scientist qua Scientist," 3. 
35 Douglas, Science, Policy, 96. 
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Evidence That Matters for Policy 
Douglas offers an example that rebuts this as a general worry. In the 1970s, slides 
of rat livers were prepared as part of a study of dioxin toxicity. These slides were 
evaluated by different teams of scientists over more than a decade, and different 
numbers of liver tumors were reported in the different evaluations. Douglas writes, 
Although not as formal as setting a level for statistical significance, the 
pathologists must be similarly concerned with false positives and false negatives. 
Suppose a pathologist chooses to take all borderline cases and judge them to be 
non-cancerous lesions. ... The consequences for such an approach will be an 
underestimation of malignancies and thus an underestimation of risk.36 
These slides were revisited again and again precisely because the study was 
"important in regulation," so that an estimate of lower risk would "likely lead to a 
relaxed regulation" which could "cause increased harm to the public." Conversely, 
judging borderline cases as malignant would have erred on the side of protecting 
public health "at the economic costs of potentially unnecessary regulation."37 
In the spirit of Jeffrey and Betz, one might note that scientists could reject 
the requirement that slides be sorted decisively into those that showed acute 
toxicity and those that did not. However: Although scientists could emphasize 
their uncertainty and the tentativeness of their conclusions to different degrees, 
there was no neutral way of relaying the objective situation to policymakers. 
Whatever report scientists gave, even refusing to report at all, would have 
consequences. So hedging or reporting confidence intervals could not escape the 
practical significance of reporting their results in one way rather than another. 
This is kind of an easy case, though. Scientists knew that their observations 
would have consequences for regulation and public health. Their observations had 
a clear valence in practical and ethical terms. Douglas herself notes this policy-
relevance restriction in the scope of her argument. She writes that 
there are some areas of science where making a wrong choice has no impact on 
anything outside of that area of research. One may think, for example, of research 
into the coherence properties of atom beams. It is very difficult to fathom how 
errors in such research could have non-epistemic consequences. Hence, scientists 
doing such research need not consider non-epistemic values.38 
                                                        
36 Douglas, "Inductive risk," 571. 
37 Douglas, "Inductive risk," 571. 
38 Douglas, "Inductive risk," 577. 
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Lots of science does not have any direct practical consequences or 
foreseeable application. Douglas claims that, in such cases, decisions can be made 
on strictly epistemic grounds. In the next section, I argue that this concedes too 
much. Even in exotic sciences like particle physics, the JRD thesis applies. 
Observation and Externality 
Following Trevor Pinch, we can distinguish possible observation reports by their 
degree of externality.39 Externality is the inverse of immediacy—that is, an 
observation posed at a lower degree of externality is in more direct terms. 
A high externality report is riskier but potentially more significant. A lower 
externality report, in contrast, is safer but less interesting. A scientist initially 
reports their observation at some level of externality. If their report is challenged, 
they can redescribe the observation at a lower level of externality and offer an 
argument which takes the lower-externality report as a premise and yields the 
higher-externality report as a conclusion. 
Pinch gives the example of Ray Davis' work to detect solar neutrinos in the 
1960s. The detection was a complicated operation. A large tank of 
tetrachloroethylene, stored in an abandoned mine shaft, was used as a target. Some 
of the chlorine atoms interacted with solar neutrinos to produce an isotope of 
argon (argon-37). The accumulated argon-37 was extracted from the tank and was 
measured based on its characteristic decay. Finally, there were some outputs from 
instruments—Pinch refers to them as "splodges." 
The outcome of the work could be reported at different levels of externality. 
From higher to lower externality, the report might be a claim about: 
 The rate of particular reactions in the sun 
 Neutrinos generated in the sun 
 Neutrinos arriving at Earth 
 Argon-37 atoms in the tank 
 Splodges on the apparatus 
This list reflects the levels parsed out by Pinch, except that he groups the 
second and third together just as "Solar neutrinos."40 The distinction between 
                                                        
39 Trevor Pinch, "Towards an Analysis of Scientific Observation: The Externality and Evidential 
Significance of Observational Reports in Physics, " Social Studies of Science 15 (1985): 3-36. 
40 Pinch, "Towards an Analysis," 17. 
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neutrinos generated in the sun and neutrinos arriving at Earth was ultimately 
important, however. Solar neutrino oscillation, a change in neutrinos as they travel 
to Earth from the sun, is now taken to explain Davis' result.41 
We could also parse this more finely. If Davis reported the number of argon-
37 atoms in the tank and someone challenged that report, for example, he could 
explain how it can be inferred from the number of argon-37 atoms extracted from 
the tank or from the radioactivity of the extracted material. This would report the 
observation at levels of externality between the last two in the list above. 
And we might add further levels of even lower externality. Faced with 
scepticism about the external world, Davis might report his sense data and argue 
on that basis that there were splodges. At that extreme, he would no longer be 
reporting anything of scientific interest. 
Davis set out to test theories about what was going on in the sun, so the 
scientifically most interesting claim would be an observation of specific reactions 
in the sun. This would involve considerable risk, however, because there were all 
sorts of ways in which his report about solar neutrinos could turn out to be wrong. 
This is not just in-principle scepticism, either, since he observed far fewer solar 
neutrinos than physicists predicted based on the reactions that they expected were 
happening. At the lowest degrees of externality, however, the report risks being 
trivial. The large and complicated project would hardly be justified if, at the end of 
it, he could report nothing more than splodges. So characterizing the observation 
required balancing considerations of risk against considerations of significance. 
These considerations reflect the cost of believing a risky claim (if it were 
false) and the cost of forgoing a significant claim (if it were true). These are the 
simultaneous demands that we should avoid error and seek truth. The JRD-thesis, 
that this tension is inescapable, applies as much to the observation claim as to the 
conclusions of inference. This means that values enter not just into the inference 
from evidence, but into stating the evidence itself. In considering Jeffrey and Betz, 
above, we saw that scientists can assign lower probabilities or hedge their reports 
in order to trade significance for security. Moving to lower levels of externality is a 
distinct strategy for doing so. In this example, Davis could have made his report 
safer by widening the error bars on his observation report of neutrino flux or by 
maintaining precision while characterizing the observation as being about objects 
                                                        
41 Note that reports at different levels of externality may exhibit the same degree of generality. 
For example, the rate of neutrinos generated in the sun is just as specific and concrete as the rate 
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at lower levels of externality. Just as widening the error bars too far would make 
the report trivial, so too would retreating to the lowest levels of externality. 
Scientists in the decades following Davis' observations worked to figure out 
what he had observed, both what could be concluded from it but also what the 
correct description of it was. Settling on the right level of externality took 
decades.42 Davis could not wait for these developments, but had to decide what to 
believe and what to report at the time. He faced uncertainty, and navigating it 
required weighing the potential costs and benefits of different possible beliefs. 
To generalize, the argument is this: In stating their observations, scientists 
face a choice between different levels of externality. Observation reports posed at a 
high level of externality are more significant, so a scientist who declines to accept a 
report in those terms risks missing out on the chance to believe an important truth. 
Conversely, such reports are also riskier, so a scientist who accepts such a report 
risks believing something false. There is no purely epistemic rule which assigns 
costs to these risks. Instead, they are a matter of value judgment. Just as ampliative 
risk means that values always play a role in theory choice, values play a role in 
every observation. 
This same pattern is seen in other cases of experimental science, and the 
concept of externality is helpful for describing what is going on in general terms. 
Kent Staley discusses collaborative research by groups like the one at 
Fermilab which discovered key evidence for the top quark in the 1990s.43 They 
must settle on reporting their findings in some form. This yields two conflicting 
but indispensable pressures, Staley argues: "[T]hey seek to avoid the embarrassment 
of making claims that subsequent work reveals to be false; they also seek to achieve 
prominence and esteem by making novel and significant claims that are upheld by 
further critical scrutiny."44 Claiming to have observed the top quark was a high 
externality report, significant but also risky. 
Boaz Miller notes that experimentalists must distinguish signal from noise.45 
There are different methods for reducing raw data, and selecting which method to 
                                                        
42 For a summary of subsequent developments, see John N. Bahcall, "Solving the Mystery of the 
Missing Neutrinos," April 28, 2004. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/themes/ 
physics/bahcall/ 
43 Kent W. Staley, "Evidential Collaborations: Epistemic and Pragmatic Considerations in 'Group 
Belief'," Social Epistemology 21, 3 (2007): 321-335 and "Decisions, Decisions: Inductive Risk and 
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44 Staley, "Evidential Collaborations," 323. 
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use is subject to social influences and considerations of risk. Claiming only to have 
observed the raw data is a low externality report, safe but insignificant. Claiming to 
have observed a definite signal is higher externality, potentially significant but also 
potentially wrong. 
Objections on the Basis of Epistemic Values 
In this section, I rebut some possible objections which suggest that the 
values involved in picking a level of externality are only epistemic values. 
Here is a first try at such an objection: Describing epistemic values, Ernan 
McMullin writes, "One value, namely truth itself, has always been recognized as 
permeating science."46 Avoiding error, too, is clearly an epistemic matter. So, one 
may object that I haven't shown how non-epistemic or ethical values are in play.  
However, the epistemic duties to pursue truth and avoid error ultimately 
pull in opposite directions. So seeking truth and shunning error are not enough, by 
themselves, to determine belief. When they are in conflict, the epistemic duties 
themselves cannot tell us how to strike a balance, and we must consider how 
important it would be to believe a claim (if it were true) and what the cost would 
be of remaining agnostic (avoiding error, if the candidate belief were false). This 
importance and cost will be practical rather than narrowly epistemic. Selecting a 
level of externality requires weighing enthusiasm against caution—that is, it 
requires reckoning with values. 
Staley describes the risk of embarrassment pitted against the thirst for 
esteem—practical considerations for scientists, rather than merely epistemic 
concerns.47 To take a schematic example, a junior scientist who needs to publish in 
order to have a chance at tenure might favor reporting a result now rather than 
waiting for further proof. They might be wrong, but waiting could be tantamount 
to dooming their career. Or consider a somewhat different junior scientist who has 
published enough to secure tenure. The risk of publishing too soon and detracting 
from their overall CV might lead them to greater caution than the first scientist. In 
both cases, they would be acting on their duties to make true claims and avoid 
making false ones, but in neither case is it just truth and falsity that guide their 
                                                                                                                      
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 47 (2014): 69-80. 
46 Ernan McMullin, "Values in Science," PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1982), 6. 
47 Staley, "Evidential Collaborations," 323, cited above. 
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decisions. They are weighing the expected utility of making claims or refraining 
from doing so. Therefore, the values involved go beyond the merely epistemic. 
Note again that the argument does not show that every value or utility is 
relevant to scientific judgment.48 Imagine that one of the junior scientists has 
already published a paper. It might be good for them if the claims that they made 
in the paper were true, but that by itself does not give them any reason to believe 
the claims. The relevant costs and benefits are the conditional ones: what they 
would have to gain by believing it if it were true, what would it cost them to 
believe if it were false, and so on.49 McMullin is explicit that he would view 
scientists weighing the expected utilities of various judgments as an intrusion of 
ethical (non-epistemic) values.50 
To revise the objection: One might concede that seeking truth and shunning 
error alone are not enough to settle theory choice but appeal to a longer list of 
epistemic values. 
It is hard to reply to this without some candidate for what these extra 
epistemic values could be. Standard lists of theoretical virtues include things like fit 
with evidence, coherence, consistency, simplicity, scope, and fertility.51 However, 
as theoretical virtues, these do not readily apply to observation. I do not see how 
these would provide any guidance in a case like Davis' neutrino observation, 
nonetheless enough guidance to settle the appropriate level of externality. One 
might attempt to enlarge the list of epistemic values even further to include other 
scientifically significant considerations, but I do not see how this could be made to 
work without collapsing the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic 
values.52 
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communicating the outcome of an experiment is subject to the full range of utility considerations 
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values in a direct and values in an indirect role. 
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To revise the objection again: One might insist that community standards 
settle the relevant considerations. There are norms in the scientific community for 
when and what to report, and the two junior scientists considered above only have 
so much leeway in what claims to publish. In the schematic case, there are 
professional standards which limit how enthusiastic the first scientist is allowed to 
be. 
Although community standards might make individual values irrelevant in 
particular cases, the general standards themselves must strike some balance 
between different possibilities of error. We saw above that a practical policy of 
flipping a coin would still reflect values at the level of policy. The same holds, for 
example, for setting a statistical threshold that results must meet in order to be 
publishable. 
Moreover, community standards cannot anticipate every possibility of novel 
research. There were no community standards about how to report neutrino 
observations which Davis could rely on to specify an appropriate level of 
externality. For Davis—and for the junior scientists in the schematic case—
community standards will constrain their choices without fully determining what 
they should believe. 
Here is a final attempt to reformulate the objection: One might hope that a 
philosophical analysis or theory of perception will determine the proper level of 
externality. Scientific observations could be posed at that level with only reference 
to epistemic values, and all other scientific claims would be inferences from claims 
at that base level. 
If the default level of externality is not to be subject to revision or scrutiny 
in the course of inference, then it must favor security over significance to an 
extreme degree. After all, even a report of splodges presumes that there is actual 
equipment yielding readings and not facades or hallucinations. Insisting that 
scientists initially represent observations only in the most secure terms would yield 
scepticism or phenomenalist empiricism.53 
                                                                                                                      
ch. 6, who considers numerous possibilities but concludes that there is no sensible way to 
construe scientific significance in purely objective or epistemic terms. 
53 Staley makes a similar point in relation to research teams. He writes that "if one were to ask 
that groups should ideally issue statements of group belief only when there is complete 
uniformity in what each individual member is 'compelled' to believe based on the evidence, one 
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Collaborations," 328). 
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Perhaps the default level of externality need not be neutral sense data and 
may be theory-laden. All that the objection strictly requires is that scientists can 
rely on it regardless of utility considerations or value commitments. The objection 
still founders, because philosophical conceptions of evidence are little help in 
selecting a level of externality. To take one example, Peter Achinstein provides a 
theory of evidence which takes empirical data or phenomena as given.54 It is about 
how bare observation becomes evidence, rather than about how observation 
becomes credible in the first place. I do not see how the problem is any less vexed 
on other theories of evidence. 
To sum up: Selecting a level of externality requires balancing the desire for 
significant findings against aversion to mistakes. This balance of enthusiasm against 
caution depends on conditional utilities. That is, it is a matter of values. Attempts 
to see these values as somehow innocently epistemic fail. 
A More Qualified Objection 
In this section, I consider an argument by Bryce Huebner, Rebecca Kukla, and Eric 
Winsberg that values play less of a role in science like the search for the Higgs 
Boson than in policy-relevant research like climate modelling.55 The result would, 
perhaps, be a limited version of the policy-relevance restriction. 
Huebner et al. discuss the search for the Higgs boson and portray 
developments at CERN in a way that is initially congenial to my argument. They 
write that "inductive risk balancing continues to occur in unpredictable and, 
perhaps, unrecoverable ways throughout the research process, even where the 
research does not aim at some obviously value-laden goal."56 Yet they go on to 
argue that the entanglement with values is importantly less complex for the 
discovery of the Higgs boson than it is for climate science. The existence or non-
existence of the Higgs boson is a binary question. So, they argue, there are risks 
only along one dimension. Climate modelling does not involve a single binary 
question and so "researchers can have any of a wide, multi-dimensional array of 
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investments in various outcomes...."57 Arguing in this way, one might say that 
straight-forward existence questions are—although not value-free—less value-
laden then more complex questions which matter to policy. 
This difference is not as significant as Huebner et al. suggest. When an 
observation is construed at different levels of externality, the evidential context 
changes—that is, the observation is taken to tell us about different things. That 
means that what is presented as a binary question hides all sorts of other 
possibilities. Davis' question might have been posed as whether the dominant 
model of the sun was correct or not, but his observations were ultimately accepted 
as measurements of the rate of electron neutrinos arriving at Earth. So a claim can 
only be construed as a binary report against an implicit, multi-dimensional 
background of individual and community commitments. 
Conclusion 
The JRD thesis points to a tension at the heart of our epistemic lives. We aim to 
believe true things, and we aim to avoid believing false things. Our duties as 
knowers require us to arrive at some balance between these, and such a balance 
reflects value judgments: Conditional on the claim being true or false, what would 
the benefit or cost be of believing or not believing? 
Neither the randomizer reply, the policy-relevance restriction, nor the 
lexical priority of evidence undo this. Values do not enter as merely a secondary 
consideration, nor do they enter only in situations with obvious policy 
consequences, nor do they enter only into inference.58 
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